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By David Hearne, Researcher, Centre for Brexit Studies at 
Birmingham City University 
Once upon a time, many years ago (before 2015), Britons used to 
mock Italy’s political system. After all, Italy was famed for its unstable 
governments, with regular changing of the political guard (Italy was 
widely famed for having over 50 governments in 50 years after World 
War 2). Of course, in reality the problems this created were more 
complex – the 50 governments were shifting kaleidoscopes of 
coalitions, with power largely in the hands of the Christian Democrats. 
After 1994 (following an earlier referendum), with the rise of Forza 
Italia, the mockery changed. Here was a country whose leader was 
gaffe-prone, facing allegations of corruption and ultimately became 
widely associated with the term “bunga bunga” amid suggestions of 
sexual impropriety. Some would suggest certain parallels with the 
UK’s present situation. 
Suffice it to say that whatever your political views, the boot (if you’ll 
pardon the pun) is now very squarely on the other foot. It is the UK 
that is facing its 3rd General Election in 4 years, in addition to 3 
referenda over the past decade (with, quite possibly, more to come). 
It is the UK that appears to face imminent break-up, with Scotland 
looking increasingly likely to secede from the Union and questions 
over Northern Ireland’s future. It is the UK that is about to willingly 
forego its seat on one of the most powerful decision-making bodies in 
the world (the EU Council). Of course, any British rump would 
probably come under pressure with regards to its permanent seat on 
the UN Security Council as well. 
The upshot of all of this is that British politics[i] is presently unstable. 
The election of 2017 saw the two major parties enjoying their highest 
combined vote share since 1970, almost 50 years ago. In contrast, if 
present opinion polls are to be believed, 2019 appears to herald a 
sharp reversal of this (ironically in line with European trends whereby 
many “traditional” major parties have seen their vote-shares eroded in 
recent years). 
Some of this reflects the peculiarities of the rather anachronistic “first-
past-the-post” voting system used in the UK.  However, a great deal is 
due to the vagaries of the electorate who remain polarised over Brexit 
and unhappy about a great many other issues. Of course, the irony of 
Britain’s once-stable polity being engaged in such contortions has not 
been lost on many observers in the rest of the EU, as Bonetti[1] points 
out.{Bonetti, 2019 #937} 
Ultimately, therefore, there is considerable uncertainty a priori about 
how the coming election will pan out. The consequences for the UK 
will be profound and reverberate for many years, not merely because 
of the bearing on Brexit, but perhaps even more importantly because 
of the bearing this will have on the type of Brexit pursued. 
So, whilst we might not know who will win the upcoming election 
(although the Conservatives enter it with a substantial lead in national 
opinion polls) we do have a reasonable idea of what menu of choices 
will be available. It is clear that the Conservative Party will run on a 
platform of passing the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated between 
Boris Johnson’s government and the EU. 
This would give the UK 6 months with which to begin negotiations on 
the “future relationship” with the EU. At that point, Great Britain (but 
not Northern Ireland) would then effectively be faced with the choice 
of a de facto no-deal exit in 31st December 2020 or making sufficient 
concessions to convince the EU to extend negotiations. We can 
clearly envisage what some of the EU’s red lines are likely to be. 
Firstly, they will want to ensure that in exchange for tariff-free access, 
Great Britain largely adheres to EU environmental and labour 
standards. To do otherwise would be seen as allowing the UK to 
“undercut” the rest of the EU. Such plans are likely to be anathema to 
many on the pro-Brexit right wing of the Conservative Party who view 
regulatory divergence as the major benefit of Brexit. Many of the 
benefits of low-friction goods trade will not be apparent unless the UK 
also agrees to adhere to EU agri-food and safety standards. Similarly, 
compliance in chemicals will be important. In every case, the UK will 
be expected to become a rule-taker. 
Since any deep FTA of the form envisaged would involve so-called 
“mixed competencies”, it would also need to be agreed and ratified by 
every EU member state and some regional parliaments. Each will 
have important interests of their own – several EU states will be keen 
to ensure access to UK waters and Spain might want a greater say in 
the future status of Gibraltar. France and others will be keen that the 
UK maintains ‘protected designation of origin’ status for many 
agricultural goods. Once again, the EU will expect the UK to be a rule-
taker and its interests will not be represented when such decisions are 
made. Many will also have a keen eye on potential Scottish secession 
as well. 
The alternative is a ‘hard Brexit’, similar to a “no deal” scenario that 
unfolds in January 2021. This would enable the UK to sign a free-
trade agreement with the USA, aligning the UK much more closely 
with US regulatory standards, particularly in agriculture. It is likely that 
such an agreement would herald a turn towards the US in areas 
including pharmaceuticals (potentially also including regulation that 
would affect NHS drug purchasing strategies) and rights for US 
investors “consistent with U.S. legal principles”[2]. The upshot would be 
a country largely outside of the EU regulatory sphere that was much 
more closely aligned with the US in a number of critical areas. 
Suffice it to say that the future envisaged by the Labour Party could 
not be more different. Their longstanding policy is to negotiate a 
customs union with the EU, which would lock the UK upholding 
minimum standards in several areas (including labour rights and 
environmental standards). They would also seek to go well-beyond 
these, forging an agenda predicated on greater redistribution. 
It is also likely that such an agreement would entail something largely 
akin to Single Market membership, although the UK’s voice in setting 
regulation would be substantially reduced. Current Labour Party policy 
is that any agreement would need to be ratified by referendum, in 
which the status quo ante (at least in terms of EU membership) would 
be an alternative. The wider stated ambition of the Labour Party is to 
pursue a radical socio-economic agenda and in many ways, the entire 
debate over Brexit appears to be a distraction from this. 
In terms of other major parties, the SNP’s platform is reasonably clear, 
seeking Scottish independence. Whilst the SNP’s official opposition to 
Brexit has been implacable and unequivocal, they are no doubt aware 
that their core agenda would be greatly boosted by a hard Brexit. The 
Liberal Democrats seek a continuation of the status quo ante, and 
would pursue this in a much broader fashion than Labour, maintaining 
much of the present post-Thatcherite consensus. 
The one outlier, and potential game-changer, is the Brexit Party. 
Ironically, their platform on Brexit is somewhat unclear. They seek a 
limited free-trade agreement with the EU, but are surely aware that 
the EU will not agree to this until the trio of issues (rights of EU 
nationals, monies owed by the UK and the border on the island of 
Ireland) are dealt with. They thus de facto wish to leave the EU 
without any agreement whatsoever. 
This will also probably preclude a free-trade agreement with the US 
(since such is dependent upon the goodwill of legislators who will be 
heavily influenced by whether the question of Northern Ireland has 
been adequately settled). In essence, the party clearly stands for 
moving as far as possible as quickly as possible from the aegis of the 
EU. However, there is no clear stated aim in terms of what this would 
be for. 
In other words, whatever happens the UK – or “Little Britaly” – will be 
utterly changed for many years to come. 
1. Bonetti, D., It isn’t personal, it’s politics, in Do They Mean Us? 
The Foreign Correspondents’ View of Brexit, J. Mair and N. 
Fowler, Editors. 2019, Bite-Sized Books: Goring. 
2. United States Trade Representative, United States-United 
Kingdom Negotiations: Summary of Specific Negotiating 
Objectives, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
Editor. 2019, Executive Office of the President of the United 
States: Washington D.C. 
[i] I use the term British advisedly here, since the political situation in 
Northern Ireland has long been distinct from that of Great Britain and, 
of course, has well-known issues of its own. 
 
